INTRODUCTION
In April 2009, the World Health Organization (WHO) announced the emergence of a novel influenza (H1N1) virus (also referred to as swine flu), which had not previously circulated in humans. This new virus was first reported in early April in Mexico and the United States and quickly spread via human-to-human contact (CDC, 2009) . By June 2009, nearly 30,000 confirmed cases had been reported in 74 countries, including 141 deaths (WHO, 2009) . The rapid global spread of the virus prompted WHO to raise the level of influenza pandemic alert from Phase 5 to Phase 6 (the highest level on WHO's six-point scale) on June 11th 2009, making this outbreak the first influenza pandemic in more than 40 years (WHO, 2009) .
As this example illustrates, the growth of international travel and trade has accelerated the spread of infectious diseases. As a result, diseases such as H1N1 are able to spread globally very rapidly. The best defense against future disease outbreaks is to equip public health professionals with systems and tools that can detect infectious diseases quickly and accurately. One solution is the use of biosurveillance and biosurveillance systems. Biosurveillance systems that can perform early detection and real-time information interpretation of disease outbreaks and bioterrorisim threats are an important component of modern disease control.
However, to optimize the utility of such systems, several challenges must first be overcome. In this paper, we discuss how the situation awareness (SA) of public health professionals plays an important role in biosurveillance. We also present our SA-oriented design (SAOD) approach that can help address the challenges facing current biosurveillance systems. Our approach will be discussed through a case study of a system designed for CDC decision makers within the context of a theoretical model of SA, citing the value of conducting an SA requirements analysis and designing SAoriented systems. We begin with a brief overview of biosurveillance, highlighting several significant issues associated with current biosurveillance systems.
BIOSURVEILLANCE AND BIOSURVEILLANCE SYSTEMS
Biosurveillance may be defined as a process that detects and identifies diseases and disease outbreaks in people, plants, or animals through monitoring disease-causing elements in the environment. Environmental elements may include bacteria, viruses, and other biological agents. Epidemiologists and other public health professionals utilize biosurveillance systems to collect and analyze data for the purpose of detecting disease cases, disease outbreaks and environmental conditions (i.e., polluted air from a local factory) that increase susceptibility to diseases (Wagner, Moore, & Aryel, 2006) . Disease outbreaks can be silent killers as people may become infected and die even before disease detection or classification. The window of opportunity to limit the damage caused by an outbreak can be as short as a few days in some of the worst cases (Wagner et al., 2006) . Thus, the primary goal of modern biosurveillance systems is to provide early and accurate detection of disease outbreaks at all monitoring levels: local, state, national, and global. Biosurveillance systems also provide background data for the detection of 1) the reoccurrence of a well-known endemic disease, 2) the appearance of a previously unknown disease, and 3) the presence of an outbreak that is deliberately created by terrorists. However, achieving the goal of early and accurate detection of outbreaks for biosurveillance systems is not easy.
The outbreak of cryptosporidiosis in Milwaukee, Wisconsin, in early 1993, is a striking example showing how difficult it is for current biosurveillance systems to detect outbreaks in a timely manner. The outbreak was caused by a breakdown of a water filtration process at a water supplier. Approximately 403,000 individuals in the greater Milwaukee area were infected. On April 7, laboratory tests confirmed that the outbreak was caused by the parasite Cryptosporidium oocyst (Wagner et al., 2006) . When reviewing this outbreak, researchers noted that the early indicators regarding this outbreak included increased demands in anti-diarrheal medications noticed by a pharmacist on April 1 and increased diarrhea-related calls to local nurse hotlines on April 2 (Wagner et al., 2006) . In this case, traditional methods of detection, such as information provided from doctors to a national health information gathering system, would not have caught this particular disease outbreak. This outbreak shows that effective biosurveillance systems will need to detect the behavioral trends of individuals who are sick, but may not seek medical attention. Developing such systems may help to reduce detection time, therefore reducing the size and severity of similar outbreaks.
At the global level, biosurveillance has been overseen primarily by the World Health Organization (WHO). During the last 30 years, several outbreaks, such as Cholera in Latin America, Pneumonic Plague in India, and Ebola Hemorrhagic Fever in the Democratic Republic of Congo, have caused worldwide concerns (Heymann & Rodier, 2004) . These disease outbreaks demonstrated that delayed and insufficient national response can cause a large number of deaths and illness in the local population, including health workers. Moreover, the reduction in detection time and subsequent decrease in response time can reduce the risk of the global spread of the disease and significant interruption of travel and trade. Thus, assistance is needed from the international public health community to provide disease monitoring and control, especially for third world countries where many of these disease outbreaks occur, but health resources are lacking.
Currently, there have been several efforts by the United States and the WHO to develop biosurveillance systems in efforts to control disease outbreaks, both at the national and global level. In particular, since 2001, the United States has spent billions of dollars per year on various forms of biosurveillance (Wagner et al., 2006) . For example, Biosense is an initiative of the United States Centers of Disease Control (CDC) to provide early detection of possible bioterrorisim and other public health concerns at the national level. Biosense was intended to "improve the nation's capabilities for conducting real-time biosurveillance, and enable health situational awareness through access to existing data from healthcare organizations across the country" (CDC, 2007) . However, as will be discussed next, numerous issues need to be overcome to increase the utility and effectiveness of current biosurveillance systems such as Biosense.
Issues with Current Biosurveillance Systems
As biosurveillance systems become more complex, they also face more challenges. One of the major issues with biosurveillance systems is their high false alarm rate. This system reliability issue highlights a classic problem of automation implementation. When an automated system creates too many false alarms, system users may not 'trust' the outcomes that are provided by the system. When a system is unreliable, for instance producing frequent false alarms, users may distrust the system and eventually abandon it.
Furthermore, designs, analyses, and evaluations in current biosurveillance systems focus on specific data sources and detection algorithms, but less effort has been put into how these systems interact with the human operator (Kass-Hout, 2008) . For instance, health professionals from different organizations may misinterpret the information regarding a given event due to the various biosurveillance algorithms they use and their knowledge backgrounds. Another important challenge facing users of biosurveillance systems is that threats of epidemics and bioterrorism evolve over time and across multiple species. Unexpected and novel disease events may be caused by infectious agents that were previously unknown, bacteria or viruses that have crossed between species, such as from animals to humans, or potential agents that have been deliberately produced and introduced by bioterrorisim (Heymann & Rodier, 2001 ). These novel diseases are often poorly understood in terms of their specific symptoms, origin, and the mechanism for transmission. Therefore, they are extremely difficult to detect and may potentially cause large outbreaks. To illustrate this challenge, consider that when SARS was initially detected in 2002, it was a new virus that did not fit into the classic epidemic profile; thus, it remained undetected until several months later. Biosurveillance systems must have the capability to handle novel epidemic profiles that do not fit into previous outbreak models. As will be discussed later in this paper, one approach to optimizing the utility of biosurveillance systems is by carefully designing these systems to effectively support the user's situation awareness. The next section presents a theoretical model of situation awareness that can be used to guide this process.
THEORETICAL MODEL OF SITUATION AWARENESS

Situation Awareness Defined
According to the theoretical model of SA proposed by Endsley (1995) , situation awareness can be defined as "the perception of elements in the environment within a volume of time and space, the comprehension of their meaning, and the projection of their status in the near future." This definition highlights three levels or stages of SA formation: perception, comprehension, and projection (see Figure 1 ). Level 1 SA (perception) involves the sensory detection of significant environmental cues. Perception is an active process whereby individuals extract salient cues from their environment. Level 2 SA (comprehension) involves integrating this information in working memory to understand how the information will impact the individual's goals and objectives (Salas, Prince, Baker, & Shrestha, 1995) . Level 3 SA (projection) involves extrapolating this information forward in time to determine how it will affect future states of the operational environment (Endsley, 1993) . Level 3 SA combines what the individual knows about the current situation with his/her mental model or schemata of similar events to predict what might happen next. Consideration of these three levels of SA is useful for understanding the types of difficulties biosurveillance professionals face while performing their tasks and also for determining how best to mitigate these challenges.
As indicated in the above discussion, SA encompasses not only the perception of critical information within the environment, but an increased understanding of the state such that future events can be predicted and proper action can be taken. Thus, SA provides the foundation for subsequent decision-making and performance in the operation of complex and dynamic systems (Endsley, 1995 Endsley, 1995) .
Situation Awareness in Biosurveillance
Situation awareness is important throughout the entire process of outbreak detection and management in biosurveillance. When an alert is triggered, the first step for health professionals is to identify whether a real biological event is present (Level 1 SA -perception). The second step in this process requires understanding patterns or trends in the data as well as the availability of resources to meet the challenge (Level 2 SA -comprehension). For instance, health professionals need to be able to determine what type of biological event triggered the alert, that is, whether the outbreak was caused by a natural source (e.g., naturally occurring viruses or bacteria) or from a bioterrorism attack. Finally, the third step involves predicting the future trends and distribution of the outbreak and the ability to determine accurate response based on those predictions (Level 3 SAprojection). For example, if the outbreak involves a highly infectious virus, health professionals will need to notify other state, national, and possibly international agencies to help contain the outbreak and prevent an epidemic.
In general, biosurveillance systems automatically process large amounts of information in order to rapidly provide public health professionals with the SA they need for early detection of potential outbreaks (Mnatsakanyan, Murphy, Ashar, & Burkom, 2007) . However, because the threats of epidemics and bioterrorism are constantly evolving, early detection has been one of the largest challenges for current biosurveillance systems. In addition, people from different local, state, and federal health agencies as well as international organizations need to work together to detect and control outbreaks. Thus, biosurveillance often involves teams of teams interacting across continents and time zones toward a common goal. As limited research exists that investigates how biosurveillance systems can be effectively used to support SA formation, we next describe a set of SA-oriented solutions that specifically target the situation awareness needs of health professionals working in biosurveillance.
SA-ORIENTED DESIGN (SAOD)
We were tasked to define SA requirements for the CDC BioPHusion Center. The second part of our tasking was to use these SA requirements in the development of an information system to provide daily situation awareness on global public health.
Given the aforementioned importance of SA in biosurveillance, creating system designs that enhance health professionals' awareness of what is happening in a particular situation can dramatically improve their detection and decision-making performance. However, traditional human factors design methods and principles are insufficient for achieving the SA needed in complex domains, such as biosurveillance, in that these primarily address the physical and perceptual characteristics of system components, rather than the way that the integrated system needs to function from a cognitive standpoint. To address this issue, we propose that the design of biosurveillance systems needs to be guided by the SAOD process, developed by Endsley and colleagues (see Endsley, Bolte, & Jones, 2003) as a means to improve human decision-making and performance through optimizing SA. The SAOD process is user-centered and derived from a detailed analysis of the goals, decisions, and SA requirements of the operator. This process has been successfully applied as a design philosophy for systems involving remote maintenance operations, medical systems, flexible manufacturing cells, and military command and control. Two main components of the SAOD process that are particularly relevant in biosurveillance are SA Requirements Analysis and SAOD Principles. The next section demonstrates how these components of the SAOD process can be applied to resolve the issues associated with current biosurveillance systems.
SA Requirements Analysis
SA requirements are defined as those dynamic information needs associated with the major goals or sub-goals of the operator in performing his or her job (as opposed to more static knowledge such as rules, procedures, and general system knowledge). These critical SA requirements can by identified utilizing a Goal Directed Task Analysis (GDTA), a unique form of cognitive task analysis that involves conducting extensive knowledge elicitation sessions with domain subject matter experts (for a detailed description of this methodology; see Endsley et al., 2003) . The objective of the GDTA is to identify the major goals and decisions that drive performance in a particular job or position as well as to delineate the critical, dynamic information requirements associated with each goal and decision (see Figure 2) . The GDTA process helps to solve one of the major challenges in biosurveillance: the sources of data are massive. Both critical sources (e.g., emergency room reports) as well as non-critical sources (e.g., drug store sales on non-prescription drugs) of information are important. The key is to determine what information is significant and to validate this information, thus avoiding collecting data that is not useful.
To determine what data is useful to decision makers in the BioPHusion Center we created a GDTA based on 26 interviews with CDC approved subject matter experts (e.g., end users and personnel familiar with BioPHusion Center concepts), documentation reviews and a process of review and revision.
The main goal of the GDTA for decision makers in the BioPHusion Center was to "Take actions needed for significant public health events". Five sub-goals were defined including:
1. Identify significant public health events 2. Exchange critical public health information 3. Determine actions needed for response to significant public health events 4. Track effectiveness of response to current significant public health events 5. Assess preparedness for significant public health events Under each main goal, subgoals (e.g., Assess the reliability and validity of public health information), critical decisions (e.g., What is the confidence level of the public health information?), and SA requirements (e.g., Impact of types of diagnostic and epidemiological data on reliability, past source reliability, impact of modeling tools on validity) were also defined.
For the design of the interface for public health decision makers, we used GDTA information along with SA-oriented design principles. Next, we describe these principles and demonstrate their application.
SA-Oriented Design Principles
The SA-oriented design (SAOD) Principles include a set of fifty design principles based on a theoretical model of the mechanisms and processes involved in acquiring and maintaining SA in dynamic complex systems (Endsley et al., 2003) . These guidelines are focused on a model of human cognition involving dynamic switching between goal-driven and data-driven processing. Supporting the SA of health professionals may be achieved by applying these principles to the design of biosurveillance systems. Due to the length of this paper we will not present all of the design principles but will instead provide a few general guidelines based on a proposed hypothetical biosurveillance system.
Organize information around goals. SAOD proposes that effective systems provide information organized around the major goals and subgoals, as identified in the GDTA (see above). One possible way to design a system is to create an interface with separate modules or function areas based on these goals (see Figure 3) . Mixing data from the information requirements of different goals in the same window would violate this design principle and make it more difficult for the health professional to work effectively. In the next section we describe the actual interface prototype that was designed for BioPHusion Center decision makers. Present Level 2 SA information directly to support comprehension. System design needs to support mapping and interpretation of trend data. This includes being able to distinguish between statistical outliers and existential outliers. For example, for common diseases, such as influenza, health professionals look for alarming trends in terms of outbreak rate and mortality. They expect some cases, but need to respond quickly if reports exceed a given threshold. Other less common yet more serious diseases, such as smallpox, require an immediate response, even if only one case is reported.
Provide assistance for Level 3 SA projections. Many systems do not provide the information needed to predict future states. This is a very demanding part of SA formation and one that novices and even some experts find difficult. As such, biosurveillance systems need to not only present data to support lower levels of SA (detection of a possible outbreak and understanding patterns or trends in the data), but, more importantly, higher levels of SA to determine the future impact of the information (predicting the future trends and distribution of the outbreak).
Explicitly identify missing information. One of the critical issues in system design is letting the end users know both what information is missing and what information is being used in the analysis. For example, a biosurveillance system may provide an alert indicating a possible outbreak of cryptosporidiosis in a major city based on a sudden large increase in pharmacy sales of anti-diarrheal medications. However, this alert could be incorrect if two large pharmacy chains had coupons in the paper for this type of medication and if sales from other pharmacy chains were not recorded or used in the analysis.
Represent information timeliness.
One of the problems facing health professionals is information recency, that is, the timeliness of the information presented. For example, latency of information from third world countries is often not optimal. Thus, health professionals need support for recalculating the current picture once they have received some data late. They also need to be able to distinguish between new and past information and be alerted to the data's age as certain diseases can spread so rapidly that even a few hours can significantly reduce data usefulness.
Support assessment of confidence in composite data. Providing health professionals with confidence ratings for the accuracy of the information displayed will support their decision making as well as alert them to when confirmation of information is needed (e.g., a coding error for Crimean hemorrhagic fever instead of Congestive Heart Failure). In addition, oftentimes, unreliable system performance (e.g., high false alarms) and lack of human interactions when using a system may be due to design issues that are caused by insufficient information standardization and management. System designs that focus on improving system reliability may mitigate such issues.
Build a common operating picture to support team operations. This can be accomplished by providing shared information displays and virtual collaborative spaces. Such tools are especially critical for health professionals in the field (e.g., local area doctors) to help establish a shared understanding of the situation. One current program, called Mesh4X by InSTEDD has been designed to support crossorganizational information sharing between different databases, desktop applications, websites, and devices (http://instedd.org/technology_released). The system provides synchronization between different software and data types so that researchers can easily share and transfer data which is needed to build a common picture. Even providing a standard mapping tool such as Google Maps will help to build shared SA.
Avoiddisplayoverloadinshareddisplays.Data overload is a common problem in many complex interface designs (see Figure 4) . The sheer amount and varying types of data that must be considered and analyzed by any biosurveillance system could easily cause the tool to be very cumbersome, complex and difficult for the end user to utilize and develop good SA. Biosurveillance systems address this by the development of automated detection algorithms, which help focus an epidemiologist's attention on potential threats, and visualization applications that seek to make patterns in the input data seem more obvious. As more sources of data are brought into biosurveillance systems, more new sources are identified. Recently, more attention has been brought to loosely structured sources of data (such as news feeds), which may offer much earlier detection than structured sources. However, the complexity can be easily managed by utilizing the GDTA and designing the tool around the goals and SA information requirements. Support transmission of different comprehensions and projections across teams. Tools need to allow sharing of intuitive assessments between epidemiologists and health care professionals. Currently, data analysis and detection tools are not integrated with listservs and other collaboration tools. Yet, the understanding of individual interpretations and team consensus is paramount to effective SA and decision-making performance.
INTERFACE DESIGN
The purpose of the interface created from the GDTA and documentation reviews guided by the SAOD Principles is to provide information about the current public health situation to CDC leadership and staff. The Decision Maker Tool (DMT) (see Figure 5 ) focuses on significant public health events. The portal provides information about significant events in terms of the event's impact on health, CDC personnel and resources, media, politics, national security, and trade and travel. The DMT contains tabs for easy navigation between maps, summary, tables, timelines, and event details. The portal provides information about significant public health events at a high level and allows the user to drill down into specific event details. The interface contains three main tabs (overview, timeline, event), and one additional tab (media) to display media sources. Information from any relevant source can be displayed on the DMT. New sources, and information from them can easily be integrated and displayed to decision makers.
Overview Tab
The Overview tab allows the user to navigate to different areas of interest, toggle between world, US, and regional views, as well as turn on/off desired layers on the map. The Overview tab contains tools to filter events by type, criticality, and time. Summary information is also provided per event selection. This tab also allows the user to view the information in a tabular or narrative format. The event filters are consistent across the Overview and Timeline tabs (i.e. if US is selected, only US events will be displayed in each of the tabs). The Overview tab is shown in Figure 5 . The Overview tab with a subset of filters is shown in Figure 6 . 
Timeline Tab
The Timeline tab displays event criticality over time for significant public health events. CDC response is also shown as a blue line under each criticality line. This tab provides summary information for each event as well as descriptions of event milestones. The projected criticality of each event is noted in the "Future" column. This screen provides Level 2 (comprehension) and Level 3 (projection) SA information. Details of the event (Level 2 and 3 SA) are shown in the bottom table when the event, a milestone, or the future projection arrow is selected. The Timeline tab is shown in Figure 7 . 
Event Tab
The Event tab contains event specific details. It contains four subtabs: a timeline with descriptions of activities and responses specific to the selected event; a graphics viewer that displays figures and tables related to the selected event; a source viewer that allows the user to see the sources used in event creation; and event details broken down by criticality type (health, CDC, media, trade and travel, security, and politics). The Event tab is shown in Figure 8 . Using the SAOD process it is possible to achieve the ultimate goal of providing the right information at the right time in the right format to support SA. An effective biosurveillance system needs to provide a common picture of the situation for all health care professionals who will access and use such a system. This ensures shared SA across all users of the system.
FUTURE DIRECTIONS FOR BIOSURVEILLANCE SYSTEMS
The development of biosurveillance systems is just beginning. To date, the majority of biosurveillance design, analysis and evaluation have been geared towards specific data sources and detection algorithms. Much less has been directed towards how these systems will interact with multiple epidemiologists working at different levels for different organizations, and how they will work in an environment with numerous biosurveillance algorithms, which may provide contradictory interpretations of ongoing events. While companies are striving to develop more comprehensive integrated tools that can be effectively used across the broad spectrum of biosurveillance to support health care teams their ability (and others' abilities) to adapt to these rapidly changing data needs is still limited. In this paper we have shown how system developers can create tools that support SA by conducting a GDTA for the end users and utilizing SAOD principles to create the system interfaces.
